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Abstract 
This paper examines the competitiveness of contests, and the quality of candidates, in local 
contests with term limits.  Previous literature is divided on the subject of term limits, with 
research finding either negative effects of term limits, or limited positive effects.  This paper 
hypothesizes that the quality of challengers will not increase in term limited contests, and that the 
competitiveness of contests will decrease for term limited offices.  Using data from California, 
Colorado, Florida, Virginia, and Washington local contests, this paper examines approximately 
four hundred-fifty candidates through survey, and approximately one thousand contests.  The 
quality of challengers does not appear to change in the presence of term limits, and incumbents 
do not seem more or less susceptible to defeat in term limited offices.  However, this analysis 
finds that the vote margin of term limited contests increases in the context of incumbency and 
partisan contests.  The implications of these findings suggest that term limits may not be worth 
the trouble of implementing, and may be having the opposite effect of what many term limit 
proponents claim.  Constituent representation is possibly negatively affected by less competitive 
contests. 
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Topic and Research Plan 
Proponents of term limits claim that, among other benefits, term limits bring electoral 
competition to offset the enormous resources of the incumbent.  The push for term limits has 
been one the “largest grassroots movement[s] in American history,” intended to “force out career 
politicians” (U.S. Term Limits 2013).  The Cato Handbook for Congress suggests that term 
limits can reverse the trend that has “put incumbents beyond the reach of the people” (Crane and 
Boaz 2003, 87).  However, I argue that term limits decrease electoral competitiveness, because 
fewer high quality candidates challenge an incumbent during their time in office.  The 
implication is that the purpose of term limits, to make office holders more responsive to 
constituents, counter intuitively makes officeholders less responsive to constituents.  This 
suggests that states that currently have term limits imposed on local offices are actually reducing 
the quality of representation.  The reason for this is that high quality challengers merely wait 
until the incumbent’s term is over, thereby creating a very noncompetitive election for as long as 
the incumbent is able to run for the seat.  
This paper uses data from elections in 2010.  These offices represent term limited and non-
term limited offices, as well as partisan and non-partisan elections.  The data on elections 
encompasses five states; California, Colorado, Florida, Virginia, and Washington state.  The 
elections examined include mayor, county commissioner, city council, school board, and special 
districts.  These data allow me to compare term limited and non-term limited offices.  Contest-
level data is used to determine the competitiveness of elections by incumbent turnover and vote 
margin, while candidate questionnaires determine the quality of candidates within contests.  
From these data it is possible to answer the question: What are the effects of term limits? 
Literature Review 
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 Term limits are widely believed to bring many benefits, among those being constituent 
representation, bringing in “new blood” to office, and facilitating better policy-making.  These 
stem from perhaps the most important alleged benefit of term limits: electoral competition.  
Term limits are widely favored compared to alternatives that have met with some success 
increasing competition; including campaign contribution limits (Stratmann and Aparicio-Castillo 
2007, 109), nonpartisan redistricting (Carson and Crespin 2004, 455), or public finance 
(Malhotra 2007, 281).  Yet, term limits do not appear to accomplish what proponents claim.  
Previous studies on the subject discussed below find either conflicting evidence, or even negative 
consequences, caused by the imposition of term limits. 
Political Party Benefits from Term Limits 
 Although the literature is not of one opinion, the prevailing opinion suggests that term 
limits only entrench incumbents.  Lopez writes that term limits always favor Republicans, as 
Republicans lose reelection and win open seats more often than Democrats (Lopez 2003, 46).  
This line of reasoning supports the idea that Republicans calculatingly endorsed term limits in 
the 1990s to turn out Democrats.  However, such an outlook is challenged by other scholars.  
Powell suggests that term limits have not given Republicans any clear advantage in state 
legislatures (Powell 2008, 32).  In short, Powell finds that term limits have had little effect on the 
composition of state legislatures (Powell 2008, 43).  Such a view is also supported by 
Schraufnagel and Halperin, who suggest that term limits have not created a diverse state 
legislature in Florida.  Their conclusion comes after analyzing victory margins in state legislative 
elections from 1988-2004 (Schraufnagel and Halperin 2006, 456).  In a broad examination of all 
fifty states, Carey supports this claim as well (Carey et al. 2006, 105).  Schaffner further 
develops the argument, and even claims that term limits allow the majority party an even greater 
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ability to remain in power (Schaffner, Wagner, and Winburn 2004, 409). The consensus from 
many scholars points to a null effect of term limits.  They do not seem to “throw the bums out,” 
especially in terms of party affiliation.  Term limits may even strengthen a party’s hold on the 
legislature.  Such an effect is contrary to the design of term limits. 
Representation of Constituents 
 While being a purported benefit of term limits, their role in representing constituents is 
debatable.  Carey argues that term limits will “undermine legislator responsiveness to the 
electing constituency” (Carey et al. 2006, 128).  In this way, term limits isolate a legislator from 
the concerns and needs of their district.  Carey’s view is directly challenged by Wright, who 
finds that legislators are “ideologically consistent in their roll call voting, even when they know 
they will not be running for reelection” (Wright 2007, 272).  This suggests that politicians are 
motivated and elected by their ideological preferences, regardless of whether term limits are 
imposed upon their seat.  With the possibility that partisanship is exerting a stronger pull on 
recent elections, Wright’s view does not find a disconnect between the wants of the voters and 
the policy decisions of the legislators (Powell 2008, 44).  The dichotomy of the two 
interpretations of representation suggests that the issue is still undecided.  Regardless, other 
scholars have found somewhat of a middle ground between the two views.  Term limits may 
produce politicians whose views are closer to the median voter position.  However, this applies 
to politicians before term limits are imposed, with the idea that legislators will want to appeal to 
a wide variety of voters so they will not vote for term limits (Chen and Niou 2005, 400-1).  At 
best, evidence is contradictory that term limits create better representation.  Clearly term limits 
do not function as a “cure all” for constituent responsiveness.  
Policy 
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 The effect of term limits on public policy is unclear and inconclusive, again suggesting 
only minor effects.  Using a theoretical model, Herron and Shotts have found that term limits 
may increase pork barrel spending in the legislature, as politicians become more myopic (Herron 
and Shotts 2006, 398).  Lopez suggests that, because “term limits weaken electoral sorting 
mechanisms,” political fiscal policy will be more volatile and lead to “legislative shirking” 
(Lopez 2003, 46).   
In a study that supports positive policy effects of term limits, and in one of the rarer 
studies on municipal offices and elections, McGlynn and Sylvester suggest the term limited 
mayors run a city more efficiently.  According to the authors, this is because term limited mayors 
are not as concerned with reelection and patronage.  Still, they conclude that term limits have “a 
limited effect on fiscal policy in U.S. cities” (McGlynn and Sylvester 2010, 128).  On a more 
general level, Apollonio suggests that the quantity of bills introduced in the legislature is not 
affected by term limits (Apollonio 2006, 274). 
The literature suggests negative fiscal effects associated with term limits, or limited 
positive effects.  While these views cannot be entirely reconciled, it may be that term limits are 
more beneficial for public policy at the municipal level, and more detrimental at the legislative 
level.  Perhaps term limits decrease entry barriers at the local level, but increase entry barriers at 
the more visible legislative level.  However, not enough research has been done on the topic to 
make this assumption.  Regardless, McGlynn and Sylvester’s research is unique in that it focuses 
on local elections, but they do not study term limits’ effects upon the types of candidates 
campaigning for office.  
Career Ambition 
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Another failure of term limits, career ambition for many legislators is not halted after 
their term is expired.  As a whole, Lazarus finds that term limits do not stop a politician from 
seeking a political career (Lazarus 2006, 378).  Adding on to that, Tothero discusses in his study 
that, when term limited out of office, several members of the Michigan House of Representatives 
chose to run for local offices.  In this way, the politicians were able to continue their political 
careers if a vertical political move was impossible or undesirable (Tothero 2003, 121-2).  If a 
state legislator is more likely to win a local seat than other candidates is unclear.  Again, term 
limits appear to fall short of their intended consequences.  If they are designed in part to “throw 
the bums out,” they are not doing so in a consistent manner.   
Electoral Competition 
 Divided opinions in the literature regarding electoral competition suggests that term 
limits’ benefits are limited.  One conclusion is that the reduction of entry barriers, in an effort to 
equalize incumbent and challenger campaign spending, is merely a redundancy to properly 
designed campaign finance reform (Lopez 2003, 46).  This view is supported by Powell, who 
finds that the change in partisan turnover in the legislatures of states with term limits is not 
different from those without term limits (Powell 2008, 43).  Schraufnagel and Halperin 
summarize by claiming that term limits have not increased electoral competition (Schraufnagel 
and Halperin 2006, 456).  Carey also supports this view, in that term limits have no effect upon 
the types of people elected to office (Carey et al. 2006, 105).   
 Other scholars disagree, or examine competition from a more candidate-centered 
approach.  Lazarus discusses that “politically experienced candidates are much more likely to be 
successful in running for [state legislature] than inexperienced candidates.”  He also examines 
another factor that needs to be considered in terms of competition: “whether the experienced 
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candidate left his or her last-held public office.  If the departure was involuntary, the candidate 
may be less likely to win an election than others with similar experience” (Lazarus 2006, 378).  
Lazarus suggests that the quality of challengers can matter in term limited elections.  Powell 
agrees with this sentiment, in that term limits would lead to minority party gains if the minority 
party was able to “field replacement candidates of equal or better quality than its own term 
limited incumbents” (Powell 2008, 43).  The limiting factor in this case for Powell is how often 
minority parties are able to do this at the state legislative level.  Still, Steen has found evidence 
that term limits in state legislatures increase the supply of high quality challengers for U.S. 
Congress (Steen 2006, 442-3).  Nonetheless, it is unclear if the same effect is applicable for 
county and sub county offices.  Research also suggests that, with the imposition of term limits, 
lobbyists are fueling more money into a candidate’s campaign as they run for the legislature 
(Richardson 2005, 189).  Tothero supports Richardson’s claim, providing research that suggests 
lobbyists are providing money to candidates at the local (sub-legislative) level (Tothero 2003, 
122).  Whether this money makes certain candidates more competitive in an election is unclear.  
Although Schraufnagel and Halperin do not find that term limits increase competition, they also 
find that “political operatives in the state go out of their way to secure a replacement with 
previous political experience” in a term limited open seat (Schraufnagel and Halperin 2006, 
457).  Whether this factor decreases competition when the incumbent is running for reelection in 
a term limited seat is not discussed.   
 Term limits do not appear to have any practical effect in terms of electoral competition 
for the state legislature.  Scholars do suggest that the quality of a challenger can theoretically 
have an effect in elections for state legislature, but is unlikely in practice.  In a circuitous way, 
term limits imposed on a state legislature may create more competitive congressional elections.  
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Increased funding from lobbyists seems to also be a factor in making candidates more 
competitive.  Regardless, though these studies do not examine cases below a state legislative 
level, term limits’ benefits appear minor at best for electoral competition.  Where the research 
falls short is in examining the quality of opposing candidates while an incumbent runs for 
reelection.  
Summary 
The benefits of term limits are unclear at best.  In terms of “starting fresh” in the state 
legislature, term limits only seem to accomplish the recycling of politicians.  Party holds on the 
legislature appear to stay constant despite the imposition of limits to an individual’s time in 
office.  Also, term limits do not seem to enhance the representation of constituents in a 
meaningful way, or produce any measurably different policy.  Even the increased 
competitiveness of districts is inconclusive, and the career advancement of ambitious politicians 
is likely unabated by limits on a particular office.  However, being one of the major arguments in 
favor of term limits, competitiveness has not been adequately examined at the local level.  
Moreover, the competitiveness of candidates entering contests for term limited offices is also 
unclear.  The effects on policy, constituent representation, and politicians’ career advancement 
may all be affected by how competitive an incumbent’s reelection is.  Due to the scarce research, 
term limits’ effects at the local level, especially while an incumbent holds the seat, is worth 
examining. 
From the literature review, this paper can advance the knowledge of term limits by testing 
two hypotheses:  
1. If term limits are imposed on local offices, then they will not increase the quality of 
candidates running in term limited contests. 
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2. If term limits are imposed on local offices, then term limits will not increase 
incumbent turnover and will cause less competitive contests through greater vote 
margin. 
3. If term limits are imposed on partisan offices, and offices with an incumbent running 
for reelection, then term limits will create less competitive elections.  
Research Design 
This paper examines competitive local elections from two aspects.  The first aspect involves 
personal candidate surveys, which are used to gauge the competitiveness of a candidate.  The 
second aspect involves data of electoral outcomes in which those candidates were running, 
including percentage of vote by candidate.   Both surveys and electoral data derive from 2010 
mayoral, city council, school board, county commissioner, and special district races in 
California, Colorado, Florida, Virginia, and the state of Washington.  These states are chosen 
because they include the three major types of offices: non-term limited, term limited, and non-
partisan. 
Term Limits’ Effects on the Composition of Elections 
The first hypothesis is tested by determining the competitiveness of candidates in term 
limited offices, measured against those of non term limited offices.  Measures including 
education, prior political experience, candidate recruitment, and candidate help during the 
campaign are examined in the context of term limits.  Higher quality candidates are likely to be 
better educated, have prior experience, and possibly are recruited and aided by party officials in 
congressional elections (Jacobson 42).  Such measures seem appropriate to measure the 
competitiveness of candidates at local levels as well.   
The Effect of Term Limits on Competitiveness 
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The measure of electoral competitiveness is based on the closeness of the outcome, and the 
turnover of an incumbent.  This derives from Gary Jacobson’s method in determining the 
competitiveness of congressional elections; in which “measures of marginality are, in essence, 
estimates of vulnerability” (Jacobson 32).  The percent margin of victory and turnover of an 
incumbent are compared on a contest-level analysis, rather than on an individual level.  In multi-
candidate elections, in which multiple seats are up for election, the vote margin is determined as 
the percentage margin between the winner with the lowest number of votes and loser with the 
highest number of votes.  This allows for each contest’s vote margin to be coded and compared 
across contests.  In this way, the correlation between term limits and electoral competitiveness is 
analyzed at the contest level.   
Limitations 
 The competitiveness of candidates at the individual level is analyzed quantitatively, but this 
nonetheless excludes many measures of qualitative data.  How the voter perceives the 
effectiveness of campaigns, how well-respected the candidate is, or simply how well-known the 
candidate is at the local level are not examined in the context of these data.  As such, several 
possible aspects of competitiveness are unknown.  These unknown variables may have a slight 
influence on the data.  Furthermore, while the survey data makes clear if the candidate is a prior 
officeholder, it is unknown in many cases which prior offices they held.  Some prior offices, such 
as state legislator or mayor, may give the candidate an advantage over their opponents in name 
recognition and resources.  Unfortunately, the data analysis does not distinguish prior offices, 
and this may slightly affect the outcome of the analysis. 
Similar problems exist for the contest-level data.  Certain contests’ outcomes may be affected 
by variables that cannot be recorded; such as a candidate that chose not to campaign (but put 
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their name on the ballot), or a particular special district office that is thought to be a stepping 
stone to a higher office (and thus create a more competitive seat).  This may reflect upon the data 
slightly; however the volume of data collected is likely to overshadow the more exceptional 
contests. 
Data 
The survey-level dataset consists of approximately four hundred fifty candidate responses in 
the 2010 election cycle.  Candidate responses come from contests in California, Colorado, 
Florida, Virginia, and the state of Washington.  The survey includes data that identifies the 
location of the contest, as well as if the respondent was victorious in their campaign.  The dataset 
includes information from respondents about their level of education (which is coded on a 1-5 
scale), if and by whom they were recruited to run in the contest, what groups helped the 
candidates in their campaigns, if the candidate is an incumbent, if the candidate held a prior 
public office, and if the candidate was endorsed by a newspaper.  These variables are analyzed in 
the context of term limits to determine whether term limits are effecting the composition of a 
contest. 
The contest-level data derives from a dataset of approximately two thousand three hundred 
candidates in the 2010 elections.  These candidates come from mayoral, county commissioner, 
city council, school board, and special district contests in the five states mentioned previously.  
The information gathered includes, where available, the presence of term limits in the contest, 
the incumbency status of the candidate, and the vote margin the candidate received.  These 
candidates represent approximately one thousand contests.  Each contest is coded with the vote 
margin between the winner and loser, as well as (if applicable) whether the incumbent won or 
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lost in the contest.  The vote margin and win/loss of incumbents are analyzed in the context of 
term limits to determine the competitiveness of the contests. 
Both the survey and contest-level datasets are gathered from the Local Government Elections 
Project (“Local Government Elections Project”).  For the purposes of this paper’s data analysis, I 
collected data on candidates’ incumbency status, and whether term limits are implemented in the 
offices examined (where possible).   
Data Analysis 
Individual-Level Data 
The survey analysis includes data from five states, broken down as follows: 
State Number of Candidates  Percent of Total 
California 115 27.98% 
Colorado 75 18.25% 
Florida 84 20.43% 
Virginia 54 13.14% 
Washington 83 20.20% 
 
The candidates running in term limited or non-term limited offices are also surveyed from the 
same five states.  Three hundred seventy-eight candidates in total could be identified as 
campaigning in contests with or without term limits. 
State No Term Limits Term Limits Total Candidates 
California 72 38 110 
Colorado 27 42 69 
Florida 54 22 76 
Virginia 33 16 49 
Washington 65 9 74 
        
Total 251 127 378 
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Four hundred eleven candidates were identified as running in visible contests.  Visible contests, 
consisting of mayoral and county commissioner candidates, are sparser in the data.  This is 
especially the case with California. 
State Non-Visible Contest Visible Contest Candidate Total 
California 111 4 115 
Colorado 44 31 75 
Florida 65 19 84 
Virginia 53 1 54 
Washington 68 15 83 
        
Total 341 70 411 
    
A measure of quality candidates in this analysis includes how the candidate was recruited.  
Specifically examined is the role of elected officials as well as political parties.  Both measures 
of candidate recruitment are tested controlling for the other.  The data rejects the null hypothesis 
that term limits effect the composition of an election; very little difference exists between 
candidates campaigning for term limited offices and non-term limited offices.  Neither indicates 
a large correlation or any statistical significance for term limits. 
Candidate Recruitment1 
  
Elected Official 
Importance Political Party Importance 
  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Constant 0.4515*** 0.0360 0.2239*** 0.0401 
Term Limits −0.0177 0.0524 0.0554 0.0512 
Importance of Party 
Recruitment (Control) 0.2761*** 0.0508 −−− −−− 
Importance of Elected 
Official Recruitment (Control) −−− −−− 0.2647*** 0.0487 
          
                                                 
1
 One * denotes probability of coefficient statistical significance of less than .10 
** Denotes probability of coefficient statistical significance of less than .05 
*** Denotes probability of coefficient statistical significant of less than .01 
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Number of Observations 378 378 
F 14.7900 15.3500 
Probability > F 0.0000 0.0000 
R - Squared 0.0700 0.0757 
Adj. R - Squared 0.0680 0.0708 
Root MSE 0.4810 0.4706 
 
Another gauge of competitiveness is the help that candidates receive as they campaign.  The 
measures in this dataset that best indicate quality candidate help are aid from elected officials 
and political parties.  Both variables are tested controlling for the other.  Much like candidate 
recruitment, there is little substantive difference of candidate recruitment in contests for term 
limited and non-term limited offices.   
 
Education is also gauged as a measure of competitiveness.  It is evaluated on a scale of one 
through six, one representing a graduate degree and six representing less than a high school 
degree.  As with candidate recruitment and candidate volunteers, there is little correlation 
Candidate Campaign Volunteers 
  Help from Elected Officials Help from Political Parties 
  Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
Constant 0.3049*** 0.3798 0.3126*** 0.0376 
Term Limits -0.0259 0.0504 0.0783 0.0500 
Help from Party (Control) 0.3943*** 0.4777 −−− −−− 
Help from Elected Official (Control) −−− −−− 0.3900*** 0.0472 
          
Number of Observations 378 378 
F 34.0900 35.3900 
Probability > F 0.0000 0.0000 
R - Squared 0.1539 0.1588 
Adj. R - Squared 0.1493 0.1543 
Root MSE 0.4617 0.4592 
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between term limits and education; the null hypothesis that term limits effect the composition of 
an election is rejected. 
 
Candidate Education in the Presence of Term Limited Offices   
  Non-Term Limited Offices Term Limited Offices   
Level of Education 0 1 Total  
1 79 27 106 
2 92 45 137 
3 51 27 78 
4 6 7 13 
5 2 0 2 
6 5 7 12 
Total 235 113 348 
        
  Pearson Chi2 (5) 9.872   
  Pr 0.079   
 
A further measure of candidate competitiveness is endorsement by newspapers.  Media 
endorsements suggest both candidate visibility, and awareness of the candidate in the 
community.  These data do suggest moderate positive correlation between the presence of term 
limits and candidate endorsement by a local newspaper.  If term limits exist, there appears to be a 
greater likelihood of a candidate being endorsed.  This correlation remains constant while 
controlling for candidate incumbency and partisan contests.  The reason for this is not entirely 
clear, but may have to do with contests for term limited offices being more high profile or less 
competitive.  If one candidate is clearly going to win, newspapers may be more prone to 
endorsing that candidate.  As such, the null hypothesis that term limits effect candidate 
competitiveness is not rejected in this case.   
Candidate Newspaper Endorsement in Presence of Term Limits 
  Coefficient Standard Error P > t 
Constant 0.2408 0.0309 0.0000 
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Term Limits 0.1075 0.0402 0.0080 
Incumbency (Control) −0.0584 0.0457 0.2020 
Partisan (Control) 0.1269 0.0418 0.0020 
        
Number of Observations 562     
F 7.74     
Probability > F 0.0007     
R-Squared 0.0299     
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0247     
Root MSE 0.45626     
 
Perhaps the best indicator of a quality candidate is whether the candidate has held a prior public 
office.  These data suggest a moderate, statistically significant negative correlation between term 
limits and candidates having held a prior office.  More simply, less experienced candidates are 
more likely to run in contests for term limited offices.  The null hypothesis is not rejected by the 
data in this case.  More interestingly, the effect of term limits is nullified when controlling for the 
presence of an incumbent in the contest.  This suggests that lower-quality candidates (those 
without prior office experience) will not run in contests for term limited offices while an 
incumbent holds the seat.  It is possible that lower-quality candidates wait until the seat is open, 
recognizing that they are unlikely to unseat an incumbent. 
  Likelihood of Candidates Holding Prior Office 
  
Without Controlling for 
Incumbent in Contest 
Controlling for Incumbent in 
Contest 
  Coefficient  
Standard 
Error Coefficient Standard Error 
Constant 0.5080*** 0.0313 0.2767*** 0.0526 
Term Limits  −0.1509*** 0.0540 −0.0706 0.0543 
Incumbent in 
Contest −−− −−− 0.2973*** 0.0526 
          
Number of 
Observations 376 374 
F 7.8000 18.6300 
Probability  > F 0.0055 0.0000 
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Contest-Level Data 
The contest-level data is drawn from the same states as the survey data.  One thousand contests 
are analyzed, most of which coming from Colorado, Florida, and the state of Washington.  
State  Number of Contests 
California 133 
Colorado 248 
Florida 246 
Virginia 107 
Washington 267 
    
Total 1001 
 
The presence or absence of term limits is known in approximately two hundred forty contests. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The average vote margin varies across states, and across term limited and non-term limited 
offices. 
  Average Vote Margin 
State Without Term Limits With Term Limits 
California 9.15 10.43 
R-Squared 0.0204 0.0912 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0178 0.0863 
Root MSE 0.4944 0.4768 
State 
Contests with 
No Term Limits 
Contests with Term 
Limits Total 
California 50 17 67 
Colorado 28 17 35 
Florida 31 11 42 
Virginia 14 6 20 
Washington 54 10 64 
        
Total 177 61 238 
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Colorado 53.122 28.94 
Florida 16.35 14.50 
Virginia 13.64 14.59 
Washington 14.90 26.39 
 
At the contest level, this paper analyzes two measures of competitiveness; the turnover of 
incumbents and the vote margin of each contest.  To test the turnover of incumbents, the victory 
or defeat of incumbents is examined in the context of both term limited and non-term limited 
offices.  The null hypothesis is not rejected by the data, there appears to be no correlation 
between an incumbent winning or losing a contest, and term limits.  Because of this, no 
interpretation can be made of electoral competitiveness based on incumbent turnover.  
Incumbent Victory/Loss in Term Limited Contests 
  Coefficient Standard Error P > t 
Term Limits -0.0050 0.0740 0.9450 
Visible Contest (Constant) 0.0033 0.1148 0.9770 
Partisan Contest (Constant) -0.0180 0.0668 0.7860 
Unopposed Candidate 
(Constant) 0.2550 0.1424 0.0750 
Constant 0.7610 0.0417 0.0000 
        
Number of Observations 193     
F 0.8100     
Probability > F 0.5175     
R - Squared 0.0170     
Adj. R - Squared -0.0039     
Root MSE 0.4248     
 
Because unopposed candidates, by definition, do not lose their seats, also examined is the 
correlation of unopposed candidates and term limits.  Unopposed candidates in this analysis are 
considered candidates campaigning in a contest as the only name on the ballot.  They often, but 
not always, have one hundred percent of the vote.  In some cases, write-in candidates on the 
                                                 
2
 The vote margin for non-term limited contests in Colorado includes a large proportion of unopposed 
candidates.  As such, this skews the results towards a less competitive vote margin, as most unopposed 
candidates have a 100% share of the ballots cast. 
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ballot had a sizeable share of the vote total.  As such, unopposed candidates may have 
competitors in an election, but no named competitors.  Regardless, holding incumbency constant, 
no statistically significant results are found.  Term limits do not correlate to unopposed 
candidates keeping or losing their seats. 
Correlation of Unopposed Candidates and Term Limits 
  Coefficient Standard Error P > t 
Term Limits 0.0127 0.0303 0.6750 
Incumbency (Constant) 0.0982 0.0276 0.0000 
Constant -0.0042 0.0212 0.8430 
        
Number of Observations 221     
F 6.3500     
Probability> F 0.0021     
R - Squared 0.0551     
Adj. R - Squared 0.0464     
Root MSE 0.2034     
 
In both the cases of incumbent turnover and unopposed candidates, there is not enough evidence 
to reject the null hypothesis that term limits do not affect the competitiveness of a contest.  The 
other measure of competitiveness on the contest level, vote margin, yields some more noticeable 
effects.  To analyze vote margin, the vote margin of contests are analyzed in the context of term 
limits, while holding constant partisan contests, incumbency, and visible contests one at a time.  
This allows being able to analyze the correlation of each of those variables on the vote margin.  
Without holding any other variables constant, term limits do not correlate with the vote margin 
of a contest.  This finding does not reject the null hypothesis that term limits do not affect the 
competitiveness of contests.  When controlling for visible contests, the correlation is also 
minimal.  However, while controlling for incumbency, the effect of incumbency in conjunction 
with term limits is statistically significant.  This suggests that term limited offices with an 
incumbent will be less competitive (with a higher vote margin), as compared to offices without 
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term limits and an incumbent.  This finding rejects the null hypothesis as well.  The greatest 
correlation occurs when controlling for partisan contests.  The effect of term limits becomes 
more pronounced, suggesting that partisan contests suppress the effects of term limits.  
Regardless, partisan, term limited contests are correlated with lower competitiveness.     
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Effect of Term Limits on Vote Margin 
  
No Control for Other 
Variables 
Controlling for 
Incumbency 
Controlling for Visible 
Contest 
Controlling for Partisan 
Contest 
  Coefficient  
Standard 
Error Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Coefficient  
Standard 
Error Coefficient Standard Error 
Constant 17.2451*** 1.8122 11.6289*** 2.5524 17.3464*** 2.0307 11.0286*** 2.3526 
Term Limits 3.5690 3.2948 1.5732 4.4019 3.6031 3.8508 8.4421*** 4.2178 
Incumbency −−− −−− 10.7454*** 3.6215 −−− −−− −−− −−− 
Visible Contest −−− −−− −−− −−− 1.4774 4.971 −−− −−− 
Partisan Contest −−− −−− −−− −−− −−− −−− 15.4112*** 3.6047 
                  
Number of 
Observations 238 216 233 233 
F 1.1700 6.62 0.3800 6.6400 
Probability > F 0.2798 0.0003 0.7659 0.0003 
R-Squared 0.0049 0.0857 0.0050 0.0800 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.0007 0.0728 -0.0081 0.0679 
Root MSE 22.6240 22.397 23.5940 22.6870 
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In an actual election, the effect of term limits on vote margins while controlling for incumbency 
might look like this: 
  Incumbent in Contest 
Term Limited 
Office 
  No Incumbent Incumbent Present 
No Term Limits 10.55 23.46 
Term Limits Present 28.23 29.23 
Predicted Vote Margin = b0 + b1 (term limits) + b2 (incumbency) 
 
There is a strong correlation between an incumbent in the race, and term limits being present.  
Contests with no term limits and no incumbent are expected to have vote margins nearly 
nineteen percentage points below contests with an incumbent and term limits.  It appears that 
term limited incumbents are more likely to have an easier time being elected, due to the expected 
vote margins being so much larger (and, thus, less competitive). 
 
The effects of term limits on vote margins while controlling for partisan contests would likely 
look similar: 
 
 
 
 
 
Voters are “cued in” to a candidate’s affiliation in a partisan contest.  Thus, competitiveness may 
go down (while vote margins increase) when voters can make decisions based on their party 
affiliation rather than name recognition.  Also worth noting is that nonpartisan, term limited 
  Partisan Contests 
Term Limited 
Office 
  
Nonpartisan 
Contest Partisan Contest 
No Term Limits 11.02 26.43 
Term Limits 
Present 19.46 23.31 
Predicted Vote Margin = b0 + b1 (term limits) + b2 (partisan contest) + b3 (term limits × 
incumbency) 
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contests are expected to be slightly more competitive than nonpartisan contests without term 
limits. It may be that, even in term limited contests without an “R” or a “D” on the ballot, 
candidates will self-select out of contests until the incumbent is out of office.  This would, 
perhaps, result in a larger vote margin for the incumbent even in a nonpartisan race.  In this case, 
the null hypothesis that term limits do not affect the competitiveness of contests is not rejected, 
because non-term limited partisan contests are less competitive than term limited partisan 
contests. 
Conclusion 
In terms of the individual-level data, the analysis generally supports Carey’s view that term 
limits do not greatly affect the composition of contests.  In terms of education, candidate 
recruitment, and candidate campaign help, very little difference exists between term limited and 
non-term limited contests.  Term limited contests do correlate with more candidate 
endorsements.  Also, candidates in term limited elections are less likely to have held a previous 
office than candidates in non-term limited elections.  This effect is mitigated while an incumbent 
is running in the race, suggesting that low quality candidates self-select out of contests in which 
there is an incumbent.  At best, at the candidate level, term limits have little effect.  Their 
implementation does not yield noticeable candidate quality.  At worst, as seems to be the case 
especially with prior office-holders, term limits may have an adverse effect; essentially weeding 
out challengers to an incumbent. 
At the contest level, term limits do not seem to correlate to an incumbent being overturned or 
unopposed.  However, when the vote margins of contests are analyzed, term limits, incumbency, 
and contest partisanship correlate to less competitiveness.  Term limits alone may not be the 
cause of decreased competitiveness.  But in conjunction with other factors, term limits’ effect 
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may be magnified.  It could be the presence of term limits, contrary to the claims of the Cato 
Handbook for Congress, which put “incumbents beyond the reach of the people.”  Less 
competitive contests (by nearly nineteen points in this analysis), resulting from a combination of 
incumbency and term limits, only serve to insulate the incumbent.  Again, as with the survey-
level data, term limits seem to have no effect or some very noticeable negative effects. 
The implications from this analysis suggest that term limits do not offset the resources of the 
incumbent in a contest.  Nor do they seem to greatly affect the types of people entering the 
contest, save for perhaps being an entry barrier for lower-quality candidates.  Term limits may, in 
fact, allow incumbents an easier reelection.  Not only will this obviously keep the incumbent in 
office longer, but it may affect the quality of representation of constituents.  Lopez suggests a 
similar scenario due to a weakening of electoral sorting mechanisms.  If incumbents are almost 
guaranteed victory until they are term limited out of office, there could be less reason for them to 
represent constituent interests.  The connection to the voters is possibly severed through an 
increase in vote margin, as candidates representing other viewpoints lose or wait until the 
incumbent is term limited out.  Furthermore, an incumbent is less accountable to voters through 
the ballot box if Election Day victory is almost assured.   
However, term limits certainly have one very noticeable effect: “kicking the bums out” after 
a set number of years.  Vote margins may be increasing in the meantime, but term limit 
proponents can still claim victory over the incumbent in the end.  I would suggest, however, that 
term limits may not actually rid politics of incumbents.  It is a possibility that they simply run for 
office somewhere else.  Such an investigation seems the natural next step after this paper.  It 
would require several years’ worth of data over many types of offices.  But, determining what 
actually happens to the “bums” may make or break the case for term limits.  Another possibility 
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for future research involves unopposed candidates.  In the data presented in this paper, there 
were simply not enough cases of unopposed, term limited candidates to depict term limits’ 
effects in a meaningful way.  An improvement to this research design would reflect that, and in 
doing so gain a better understanding of why unopposed candidates are unopposed.   
This paper adds to the knowledge of term limits’ effects in local contests, and on 
competitiveness.  While term limits do not seem worth the burden of implementing on an office, 
future research could focus on individual candidates and their career paths after being term 
limited.  In the meantime, ridding offices of term limits may bring some greater electoral 
competition back to local contests.   
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